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The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer
(buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem
of designing truthful mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the participating
agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of general (non-monotone) submodular valua-
tion functions and derive the first truthful, budget-feasible and O(1)-approximation mechanisms that run in
polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions. Since the introduction of the
problem by Singer [40], obtaining efficient mechanisms for objectives that go beyond the class of monotone
submodular functions has been elusive. Prior to our work, the only O(1)-approximation mechanism known
for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries.
At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization
under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a
good approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly en-
force truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problemwhere—crucially—the agents are not ordered
according to their marginal value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online
setting as well.
To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the case where additional feasibility
constraints are present, e.g., at most k agents can be selected. We obtain O(p)-approximation mechanisms
for both monotone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent
sets of a p-system. With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known for this
setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting that, when one cares about non-trivial
approximation guarantees in polynomial time, our results are asymptotically best possible.
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1 INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of designing budget-feasible mechanisms for a natural model of procure-
ment auctions. In this model, an auctioneer is interested in buying services (or goods) from a set of
agentsA. Each agent i ∈ A specifies a cost ci to be paid by the buyer for using his service; crucially,
these costs are assumed to be private information. The auctioneer has a budget B and a valuation
functionv(·), wherev(S) specifies the value derived from the services of the agents in S ⊆ A. Given
the (reported) costs of the agents, the goal of the auctioneer is to choose a budget-feasible subset
S ⊆ A of the agents, such that the valuation v(S) is maximized. Budget-feasibility here means that∑
i ∈S pi ≤ B, where pi is the payment issued from the mechanism to agent i .
Note that the agents might try to extract larger payments from the mechanism by misreporting
their actual costs—which of course is undesirable from the auctioneer’s perspective. The goal,
therefore, is to design budget-feasible mechanisms that (i) elicit truthful reporting of the costs by all
agents, and (ii) achieve a good approximation with respect to the optimal value for the auctioneer.
What makes the problem so intriguing is the fact that truthfulness and budget-feasibility are two
directly conflicting goals, since the former is achieved by paying as much as needed to make agents
indifferent to lying (see Lemma 2.4). Indicatively, the use of the celebrated truthful VCGmechanism
in this setting completely fails with respect to keeping the payments bounded [40].
The problem of designing budget-feasible mechanisms was introduced by Singer [40] and has
received a lot of attention, both because of its theoretical appeal and of its relevance to several
emerging application domains. A prominent such application is in crowdsourcing marketplaces
(such as Mechanical Turk, Figure Eight and Clickworker) which provide online platforms to pro-
cure workforce (see [3, 26, 31]). Another application is in the context of influence maximization in
social networks, where one seeks to select influential users (see [1, 41]).
We focus on the design of budget-feasible mechanisms for the general class of non-monotone
submodular valuation functions. Submodular objectives constitute an important class of valuation
functions as they satisfy the property of diminishing returns, which naturally arises in many set-
tings. Most existing works make the assumption that the valuation functions are monotone (non-
decreasing), i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ) for S ⊆ T . Although the monotonicity assumption makes sense in
certain applications, there are several examples where it is violated. For example, in the context of
influence maximization in social networks, adding more users to the selected set may sometimes
result in negative influence (see [12]). The most prominent example of a non-monotone submodu-
lar objective studied in our setting is the budgetedmax-cut problem [2, 18], wherev(·) is determined
by the cuts of a given graph.
A natural generalization of this framework is to assume that the space of feasible sets has some
structure, e.g., the feasible sets form a matroid. This variant has been studied only for additive
valuation functions [1, 35], despite its wide range of applications varying from team formation to
spectrum markets (see [35]). Here we study the problem for monotone and non-monotone sub-
modular objectives under p-system constraints.
The purely algorithmic versions of these mechanism design problems ask for the maximiza-
tion of a (non-monotone) submodular function subject to the constraint that the total cost of the
selected agents does not exceed the budget; often referred to as a knapsack constraint. These prob-
lems are typically NP-hard, hence our focus is on approximation algorithms that compute a close
to optimal solution in polynomial time. From an algorithmic point of view, most of these problems
are well-understood and admit good approximations. However, it is not clear how to appropriately
convert these algorithms into truthful, budget-feasible mechanisms and, up to this work, this goal
had been elusive. Our results illustrate that for the mechanism design problems it is possible to
achieve the same asymptotic guarantees that are known for their algorithmic counterparts.
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Our Contributions. We derive the first budget-feasible and O(1)-approximate mechanisms for
non-monotone submodular objectives, both for the offline and the online setting. Our results for
the online setting hold for the well-studied secretary model, where the agents arrive in a uniformly
random order. Our mechanisms run in polynomial time in the value query model. The highlights
of this work are as follows:
• We obtain the first universally truthful, budget-feasible O(1)-approximation mechanism for
non-monotone submodular objectives in the value query model.
• We derive the first universally truthful, budget-feasibleO(1)-approximation online mechanism
for non-monotone submodular objectives. As a consequence, we obtain the firstO(1)-approxima-
tion algorithm for the non-monotone Submodular Knapsack Secretary Problem (see also Remark
4.5), a budget constrained variant of the infamous Secretary Problem.
• We give universally truthful, budget-feasible O(p)-approximation mechanisms for both mono-
tone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets
of a p-system. Beyond the additive case, nothing was known for this constrained setting.
• We provide lower bounds illustrating that asymptotically our results are best possible. On a
high level, only trivial guarantees can be achieved in polynomial time if one goes beyond the
class of general submodular functions or imposes constraints beyond downward closed systems.
Technical Challenges. It should be noted that for monotone submodular objectives all known
mechanisms essentially use the same greedy subroutine introduced by Singer [40]: Sort all agents
in decreasing order of marginal value per cost and pick as many agents as possible before hitting
some carefully selected threshold. This is a simplified version of the optimal greedy algorithm of
Sviridenko [43] and indeed gives non-trivial approximation guarantees. Further, due to its sim-
plicity it also has the other desired properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget-
feasibility. While this whole framework might feel somewhat straightforward, the existing litera-
ture on budget-feasible mechanisms suggests that there is a frail balance between simplicity and
performance here. Only “naive” algorithmic ideas, like greedy, seem to have any hope generating
truthful mechanisms that are robust subject to cost changes and, thus, budget-feasible.
Unfortunately, it is easy to construct examples where running such a greedy algorithm for a non-
monotone objective results in a solution of arbitrarily poor quality. The algorithmic state-of-the-art
for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint, e.g., [16, 24, 32], pro-
vides us with quite involved algorithms on continuous relaxations of the problem that seem very
unlikely to yield monotone allocation rules, and thus truthful mechanisms. The only simple (and
deterministic) exception is the two-pass greedy algorithm of Gupta et al. [28], where it is shown
that running Sviridenko’s greedy algorithm twice and then maximizing without the knapsack con-
straint is sufficient to get a deterministic 6-approximation algorithm.1 Despite being significantly
simpler, however, this two-pass greedy algorithm still suffers with respect to monotonicity.
More recently, several simple randomized greedy approaches for maximizing non-monotone
submodular objectives subject to other (i.e., non-knapsack) constraints were proposed [14, 15, 22,
25]. However, these approaches are also not applicable here. In its simplest version such a random
greedy algorithm would initially randomly discard half of the agents and then run a greedy algo-
rithm for monotone submodular objectives. A first issue is that this approach has not been studied
for knapsack constraints. And while it is tempting to believe that random greedy algorithms easily
1In fact, that algorithm has an approximation ratio of 4 + α , where α is the approximation ratio of any deterministic
algorithm for the unconstrained maximization of non-monotone submodular functions. Recently, Buchbinder and Feldman
[13] suggested a deterministic 2-approximation algorithm for the unconstrained problem, hence the ratio of 6.
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extend to such constraints, it does not seem straightforward (see also Remark 4.5). A second, and
probably more serious, issue is that even if a random greedy algorithm directly worked for a knap-
sack constraint in terms of approximate optimality and truthfulness, budget-feasibility crucially
depends on the monotonicity of the objective function [17, 40]. So, one still needs to deal with the
fact that for non-monotone objectives the payments of simple greedy algorithms (like the one by
Singer [40]) can be unbounded.
At the heart of our approach lies a novel deterministic greedy algorithm for non-monotone sub-
modular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions
simultaneously, yet prevents agents to jump from one solution to the other by changing their cost.
To do the latter we offer each agent a take-it-or-leave-it price based on an estimate of the optimal
value which we obtain by sampling. Moreover, this is the first mechanism for the problem where—
crucially—the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal value per cost. This further
allows us to appropriately modify the algorithm and adapt it to the online secretary setting and to
settings with additional feasibility constraints, while maintaining all its desired properties.
All of our mechanisms are randomized and, in fact, random sampling is an essential building
block in our approach. Obtaining a good estimate of the optimal value via random sampling has
been crucial in previous works on budget-feasible mechanism design for monotone objectives as
well [2, 5, 10, 35]. Designing deterministic budget-feasible mechanisms seems very challenging. Be-
yond additive valuation functions [17, 40], no deterministic, polynomial-timeO(1)-approximation
mechanisms are known, except for some specific well-behaved objectives [1, 2, 18, 29, 41]. In order
to obtain a constant approximation ratio while maintaining truthfulness, one would need to com-
pare the single most valuable agent to an easy-to-calculate estimate of the optimal value that is also
non-increasing to each agent’s cost. Obtaining deterministic, budget-feasible,O(1)-approximation
mechanisms is an intriguing topic for future research.
Related Work. As mentioned above, the study of budget-feasible mechanisms was initiated by
Singer [40], who gave a randomized O(1)-approximation mechanism for monotone submodular
functions. Later, Chen et al. [17] significantly improved the approximation ratio and also suggested
a deterministic O(1)-approximation mechanism, albeit with superpolynomial running time. Sev-
eral follow-up results modified this deterministic mechanism so that it runs in polynomial time
for special cases, including coverage functions [1, 41] and information gain functions [29]. For
subadditive functions, Dobzinski et al. [18] suggested a O(log2 n)-approximation mechanism, and
gave the first constant factor mechanisms for a special case of non-monotone objectives, namely
cut functions. The factor for subadditive functions was later improved to O(logn/log logn) by
Bei et al. [10], who also gave a randomized O(1)-approximation mechanism for XOS functions,
albeit in exponential time in the value query model, and further initiated the Bayesian analysis
in this setting.2 Amanatidis et al. [2] suggestedO(1)-approximation mechanisms for a subclass of
non-monotone submodular objectives, namely symmetric submodular objectives, however their
approach does not seem to generalize beyond this subclass. For settings with additional combina-
torial constraints, Amanatidis et al. [1] and Leonardi et al. [35] gave O(1)-approximation mech-
anisms for additive valuation functions subject to independent system constraints. There is also
a line of related work under the large market assumption (where no participant can significantly
2Bei et al. [10] propose anO (1)-approximation mechanism for non-decreasing XOS objectives that runs in polynomial time
in the much stronger demand query model. However, they discuss how to extend their result to general XOS functions via
the use of vˆ(S ) = maxT ⊆S v(T ). It is easy to see that vˆ is non-decreasing and that S is an optimal solution of v if and only
if it is a minimal optimal solution for vˆ . Moreover, Gupta et al. [27] proved that if v is general XOS then vˆ is monotone
XOS. It should be noted that this transformation does not work for submodular functions [2]. Therefore, known results for
monotone submodular functions do not extend to the non-monotone case, even in the demand query model.
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affect the market outcome), which allows for mechanisms with improved performance (see, e.g.,
[3, 7, 26, 31, 42]).
The online version of the problem was introduced and studied by Badanidiyuru et al. [5] who
give an O(1)-approximation mechanism for monotone submodular functions. This is closely re-
lated to the purely algorithmic version of the problem (i.e., without the incentives), namely the
Submodular Knapsack Secretary Problem introduced by Bateni et al. [8] as a generalization of
the Knapsack Secretary Problem [4]. Bateni et al. studied the problem for monotone and non-
monotone submodular objectives, although their argument for the latter case is not sound (see
Remark 4.5). While the monotone submodular case has been improved [23] and generalized [30],
there is no follow-up work on the non-monotone case to the best of our knowledge.
On maximization of submodular functions subject to knapsack or other type of constraints,
there is a vast literature, going back several decades (see, e.g., [39, 44]). Focusing on knapsack con-
straints, there is a rich line of recent work on developing algorithms on continuous relaxations of
the problem (see, e.g., [16, 20, 24, 32] and references therein) achieving an e-approximation for non-
monotone objectives. However, the most relevant recent work to ours is that of Gupta et al. [28]
who proposed a deterministic 6-approximation algorithm for the non-monotone case, related on a
high level to our main approach. Gupta et al. also gave algorithms for certain constrained secretary
problems, although not with knapsack constraints. When ℓ knapsack constraints and a p-system
constraint are both present, the algorithmic state-of-the-art is a (p + 2ℓ + 1)-approximation algo-
rithm for the monotone submodular case due to Badanidiyuru and Vondrák [6] and a (p + 1)(2p +
2ℓ + 1)/p-approximation algorithm for the non-monotone submodular case due to Mirzasoleiman
et al. [37].
As mentioned above, there is a line of work that uses random greedy algorithms for maximizing
non-monotone submodular objectives subject to other combinatorial constraints [14, 15, 22, 25].
Although not directly related to our work, there are underlying similarities as the algorithms de-
veloped are simple, greedy and often extend to online settings. Additionally, if one could resolve
the issue of the payments being unbounded, a random greedy version of Singer’s mechanism could
lead to significantly improved approximation guarantees in our setting.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We use A = [n] = {1, 2, . . . ,n} to denote a set of n agents. Each agent i is associated with a private
cost ci , denoting the cost for participating in the solution. We consider a procurement auction
setting, where the auctioneer is equipped with a valuation function v : 2A → Q≥0 and a budget
B > 0. For S ⊆ A, v(S) is the value derived by the auctioneer if the set S is selected (for singletons,
we will often write v(i) instead of v({i})). Therefore, the algorithmic goal in all the problems we
study is to select a set S that maximizes v(S) subject to the constraint
∑
i ∈S ci ≤ B. We assume
oracle access tov via value queries, i.e., we assume the existence of a polynomial time value oracle
that returns v(S) when given as input a set S .
A functionv is non-decreasing (often referred to asmonotone), ifv(S) ≤ v(T ) for any S ⊆ T ⊆ A.
We consider general (i.e., not necessarily monotone), normalized (i.e., v(∅) = 0), non-negative
submodular valuation functions. Since marginal values are extensively used, we adopt the shortcut
v(i | S) for the marginal value of agent i with respect to the set S , i.e., v(i | S) = v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S).
The following three definitions of submodularity are equivalent. While definition (i) is the most
standard, the other two alternative definitions will be useful later on.
Definition 2.1. A function v , defined on 2A for some set A, is submodular if and only if
(i) v(i | S) ≥ v(i |T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ A, and i < T .
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(ii) v(S) +v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪T ) +v(S ∩T ) for all S,T ⊆ A.
(iii) v(T ) ≤ v(S) +
∑
i ∈T S v(i | S) −
∑
i ∈S T v(i | S ∪T {i}) for all S,T ⊆ A.
In Section 6 we also deal with valuation functions that come from a superclass of submodular
functions, namely XOS or fractionally subadditive functions. In particular, it is known that non-
negative (monotone) submodular functions are a strict subset of (monotone) XOS functions [27,
33].
Definition 2.2. A function v , defined on 2A for some set A, is XOS or fractionally subadditive, if
there exist additive functions α1, . . . ,αr , for some finite r , such that v(S) = maxi ∈[r ] αi (S).
We often need to argue about optimal solutions of sub-instances of the original instance (A,v, c,B).
Given a cost vector c, and a subset X ⊆ A, we denote by cX the projection of c on X , and by c−X
the projection of c on A X . By opt(X ,v, cX ,B) we denote the value of an optimal solution to the
problem restricted on X . Similarly, opt(X ,v,∞) denotes the value of an optimal solution to the
unconstrained version of the problem restricted on X . For the sake of readability, we usually drop
the valuation function and the cost vector, and write opt(X ,B) and opt(X ,∞), respectively.
Mechanism Design. In the strategic version that we consider here, every agent i ∈ A only has
his true cost ci as private information. Hence, this is a single-parameter environment. A mechanism
M = (f ,p) in our context consists of an outcome rule f and a payment rule p. Given a vector of
cost declarations, b = (bi )i ∈A, where bi denotes the cost reported by agent i , the outcome rule of
the mechanism selects the set f (b) ⊆ A. At the same time, it computes payments p(b) = (pi (b))i ∈A
where pi (b) denotes the payment issued to agent i . Hence, the final utility of agent i is pi (b) − ci .
Unless stated otherwise, our mechanisms run in polynomial time in the value query model.
Further properties we want to enforce in our mechanism design problem are the following.
Definition 2.3. A mechanismM = (f ,p) is
• truthful, if reporting ci is a dominant strategy for every agent i .
• individually rational, if pi (b) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ A, and pi (b) ≥ ci , for every i ∈ f (b).
• budget-feasible, if
∑
i ∈A pi (b) ≤ B for every b.
For our randomizedmechanismswe use the strong notion of universal truthfulness, whichmeans
that the mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms. As all the
mechanisms we suggest are universally truthful, we will consistently use c = (ci )i ∈A rather than
b = (bi )i ∈A for the declared costs in their description and analysis.
To design truthful mechanisms for single-parameter environments, we use a characterization by
Myerson [38]. We say that an outcome rule f is monotone, if for every agent i ∈ A, and any vector
of cost declarations b, if i ∈ f (b), then i ∈ f (b ′i , b−i ) for b
′
i ≤ bi . That is, if an agent i is selected
by declaring cost bi , then he should still be selected by declaring a lower cost. Myerson’s lemma,
below, implies that monotone algorithms admit truthful payment schemes (often referred to as
threshold payments). This greatly simplifies the design of truthful mechanisms, as one may focus
on constructing monotone algorithms rather than having to worry about the payment scheme.
For all of our mechanisms, we assume that the underlying payment scheme is given by Myerson’s
lemma.
Lemma 2.4 ( Myerson [38]). Given a monotone algorithm f , there is a unique payment scheme p,
such that (f ,p) is a truthful and individually rational mechanism, given by
pi (b) =
{
supb ′i ∈[ci ,∞){b
′
i : i ∈ f (b
′
i , b−i )} , if i ∈ f (b),
0 , otherwise.
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Remark 2.5. We may assume, without loss of generality, that in any given instance all the costs
are upper bounded by the budget. To see this notice that neither our mechanisms nor the optimal
offline solution will ever consider any agent with cost higher than B. Furthermore, no agent has an
incentive to misreport a very high true cost. Indeed, due to budget-feasibility, if agent i reports a
cost bi ≤ B instead of his true cost ci > B and is selected, then he has utility pi (b) − ci < B −B = 0.
Thus, in all of our mechanisms we implicitly assume a preprocessing step that removes all the
agents with declared costs exceedingB. The resulting instance (given as input to the corresponding
mechanism) has the same set of optimal solutions subject to the budget constraint as the original
one. Note that in the case of the online mechanism GenSm-Online rejecting such agents as they
arrive suffices.
Remark 2.6. We should stress that wherever tie-breaking is needed (e.g., in lines 3 and 10 of
Simultaneous Greedy, during the execution of the auxiliary algorithms alg1, alg2 and alg3,
etc.), we assume the consistent use of a tie-breaking rule that is independent of the declared costs.
An obvious such choice would be a deterministic lexicographic tie-breaking rule.
3 AN EFFICIENT MECHANISM FOR SUBMODULAR OBJECTIVES
The main result of this section is the first O(1)-approximation mechanism (termed GenSm-Main
below) for non-monotone submodular valuation functions.
Theorem 3.1. GenSm-Main is a universally truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible,O(1)-
approximation mechanism.
At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular max-
imization under a knapsack constraint (Simultaneous Greedy below). As we mentioned in the
Introduction, all known mechanisms use the same greedy subroutine: sort all agents in decreasing
order of marginal value per cost and pick as many agents as possible before hitting some threshold.
While for monotone submodular objectives this gives a non-trivial approximation guarantee, for
non-monotone objectives may result in arbitrarily bad solutions. Moreover, continuous algorith-
mic approaches for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint [24, 32]
seem very unlikely to yield monotone allocation rules, and thus truthful mechanisms. The only
algorithm that is conceptually close to our approach is the two-pass greedy algorithm of Gupta
et al. [28], that runs Sviridenko’s greedy algorithm twice and then maximizes without the knap-
sack constraint to get a deterministic 6-approximate solution. The intuition behind this approach
is that submodularity prevents the greedy algorithm from getting stuck in consecutive “bad” local
maxima. Despite being significantly simpler, however, this two-pass greedy algorithm still suffers
irreparably with respect to monotonicity, as it allows agents to jump from one solution to the other
by changing their cost.
Here we introduce Simultaneous Greedy, a greedy mechanism that builds two candidate so-
lutions simultaneously. While the analysis of Gupta et al. [28] does not apply here (our solutions
are neither built sequentially nor according to the standard greedy algorithm), the way we obtain
our approximation guarantee is of the same flavor: at least one of the solutions will contain an
approximately optimal set. At the same time Simultaneous Greedy prevents agents to choose
their favorite candidate solution by misreporting their cost. To achieve that, we offer each agent a
take-it-or-leave-it price based on an estimate x of the optimal value which we obtain by sampling.
This is the first mechanism for the problem where it is crucial that the agents are not ordered with
respect to their marginal value per cost. This will further allow us to appropriately modify Simul-
taneous Greedy for the online setting of Section 4 while maintaining all its desired properties.
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The parameter β is later set to 9.185 in order to get the approximation factor of Corollary 3.9
but, otherwise, our analysis is independent of its value. alg2 in line 9 can be any approximation
algorithm for unconstrained non-monotone submodular maximization. In particular, here we may
use the deterministic 2-approximation algorithm of Buchbinder and Feldman [13].
Simultaneous Greedy(D,v, cD ,B, x)
1 S1 = S2 = ∅; B1 = B2 = B;U = D /* each S j has its own budget Bj */
2 while maxi ∈U , j∈{1,2} v(i |S j) > 0 do
3 Let (ıˆ, ˆ) ∈ argmaxi ∈U , j∈{1,2} v(i |S j)
4 if cıˆ ≤
βB
x
v(ıˆ |S ˆ ) ≤ B ˆ then
5 S ˆ = S ˆ ∪ {ıˆ}
6 B ˆ = B ˆ −
βB
x
v(ıˆ |S ˆ )
7 U = U {ıˆ}
8 for j ∈ {1, 2} do
9 Tj = alg2(S j ) /* a 2-approximate solution with respect to opt(S j, v, cSj , ∞) */
10 Let S be the best solution among S1, S2,T1,T2
11 return S
Ideally, we would like the rate parameter x to be close to opt(A,B) and also to be robust in the
sense that no single agent can significantly affect its value. To achieve that, Sample-then-Greedy
randomly partitions the set of agents into two sets A1 and A2, then approximately solves the prob-
lem on A1 to obtain an estimate of opt(A1,B), and finally uses this x to set the threshold rate for
Simultaneous Greedy on A2.
alg1 in line 2 can be any approximation algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization
subject to a knapsack constraint. In particular, here we may use the e-approximation algorithm of
Kulik et al. [32] (also see Remark 3.10).
Sample-then-Greedy(A,v, c,B)
1 Put each agent of A in either A1 or A2 independently at random with probability
1
2
2 x = v(alg1(A1)) /* an e-approximation of opt(A1, v, cA1, B) */
3 return Simultaneous Greedy(A2,v, cA2,B, x)
Lemma 3.7 in Subsection 3.1, due to Bei et al. [9] and Leonardi et al. [34], guarantees that with
high probability both A1 and A2 contain enough value subject to the budget constraint for things
to work, as long as no agent is too valuable. The latter leads to the final mechanism GenSm-Main
(General Submodular-Main) that randomizes between all the above and just returning a best sin-
gleton.
GenSm-Main(A,v, c,B)
1 With probability p = 0.201 : return i∗ ∈ argmaxi ∈Av(i)
2 With probability 1 − p : return Sample-then-Greedy(A,v, c,B)
Remark 3.2. Here it is necessary that Simultaneous Greedy uses thresholds in order to achieve
the properties stated in Theorem 3.1. While this goes beyond the point of this work, one can
follow the same approach of greedily building two solutions at the same time (using a variant
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of Sviridenko’s algorithm [43]), in order to design a deterministic 7-approximation algorithm for
maximizing non-monotone submodular functions subject to a knapsack constraint.
3.1 Proving the Properties of GenSm-Main
We fix some additional notation to facilitate the presentation of the proofs. We use (D,v, c,B, x)
for a generic instance given to Simultaneous Greedy and S for the set returned. By i1, i2, . . . , it
we denote the sequence of agents of D examined during this execution of the algorithm in this
exact order. All the agents of S clearly appear within this sequence, so for any particular ℓ ∈ S we
have that ℓ = ik for some k . By jk we denote the index ˆ picked during the kth execution of line 3
of Simultaneous Greedy, while by S (k)jk and B
(k)
jk
we denote the set S jk and its remaining budget,
respectively, at that time. Conventionally, we use notation like S (k+1)jk to denote S jk right after the
kth execution of line 7, even if line 3 is never executed more than k times. Recall that we use a
tie-breaking rule that is independent of the costs, as mentioned in Remark 2.6.
Lemma 3.3. The allocation rule defined by Simultaneous Greedy is monotone. Thus, using the
threshold payments of Myerson’s lemma, the resulting mechanism is truthful and individually ratio-
nal.
Proof. By Lemma 2.4, we just need to show that the allocation rule is monotone, i.e., a winning
agent remains a winner if he decreases his cost. In fact, we show something stronger, namely that
no winning agent can affect the output of Simultaneous Greedy by lowering his bid.
Let S be the set returnedwhen the input is (D,v, c,B, x) and fix some agent ik ∈ S . That is, during
the kth execution of line 3, (ıˆ, ˆ) = (ik , jk ). Fix the vector c−ik for the other agents, and suppose
that agent ik declares c ′ik < cik . Clearly, the execution of Simultaneous Greedy(D,v, (c−ik , c
′
ik
),
B, x) will be exactly the same as before for agents i1, . . . , ik−1. Further, ˆ will again be jk . Thus, ik
will again be added to the S (k)jk since
c ′ik < cik ≤
βB
x
v
(
ik
 S (k)jk ) ≤ Bjk .
After updating Bjk to B
(k)
jk
−
βB
x v
(
ik |S
(k)
jk
)
, everything is exactly the same as in the beginning of the
(k + 1)th iteration of the original execution of Simultaneous Greedy(D,v, c,B, x) and, therefore,
the algorithm will proceed in exactly the same way to produce the same output S . In particular,
agent ik will still be a winner. 
In all the following statements, when we refer to mechanisms, we always assume threshold pay-
ments. Before we study the total payment, we should point out that enforcing budget-feasibility
has been the main source of technical difficulties in the budget-feasible mechanism design litera-
ture. A significant advantage of the take-it-or-leave-it approach used in threshold mechanisms like
Simultaneous Greedy is that the budget-feasibility becomes much more manageable. To some
extent this comes at the expense of the approximation guarantee and its analysis, but also offers
some additional flexibility that will be explored in Sections 4 and 5.
Lemma 3.4. The mechanism Simultaneous Greedy is budget-feasible.
Proof. Let S be the set returned given the instance (D,v, c,B, x) and fix ik ∈ S . We claim that
the payment pik (c) is exactly πk =
βB
x
v
(
ik |S
(k)
jk
)
, i.e., ik ∈ S if and only if he bids c ′ik ≤ πk . First
note that ik cannot affect the time when he is examined by the mechanism or which agents come
before him. So, since c−ik is fixed, during the kth execution of line 3, he is always “offered” πk ;
either he accepts, i.e., c ′ik ≤ πk , and the algorithm proceeds in the exact same way as with c
′
ik
= cik
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(see also the proof of Lemma 3.3) or he rejects, i.e., c ′ik > πk , and he is removed from the active set
of agents. Once an agent is removed, however, he is never reexamined and thus, if c ′ik > πk then
ik is not in the winning set.
Recall that S can be any of S1, S2,T1,T2. We will show that all four sets are budget-feasible. Let
T1 = {ia1 , ia2 , . . . , ia |T1 | } and S1 = {ib1 , ib2, . . . , ib |S1 | }, where (ai )
|T1 |
i=1 is a subsequence of (bi )
|S1 |
i=1
which is a subsequence of 1, 2, . . . , t . Recall that the budget B1 for S1 is never exhausted. We have
|T1 |∑
τ=1
πaτ ≤
|S1 |∑
τ=1
πbτ =
|S1 |∑
τ=1
βB
x
v
(
ibτ |S
(bτ )
jbτ
)
= B − B
( |S1 |+1)
1 ≤ B .
The first and the second sum represent the total payment when S = T1 and when S = S1, respec-
tively. The budget-feasibility ofT2 and S2 is proved in the exact same way. 
Corollary 3.5. The mechanism GenSm-Main is universally truthful, individually rational and
budget-feasible.
Proof. Given that alg1 and alg2 run in polynomial time, and that it is straightforward to de-
termine the payments (Lemma 3.4), it is clear that GenSm-Main is a polynomial-time mechanism.
Further, GenSm-Main is a probability distribution over the mechanism that returns i∗ ∈
argmaxi ∈Av(i) and Simultaneous Greedy(D,v, cD ,B,v(alg1(A D))) for all D ⊆ A. The sim-
ple mechanism that returns i∗ and pays him the threshold payment is truthful and individually
rational. Further, it is clear that the threshold payment is exactly B, so this mechanism is budget-
feasible as well.
The desired properties of GenSm-Main now follow from Lemmata 3.3 and 3.4 and the above
observations. 
Lemma 3.6. If there is a positive integer ℓ such that maxi ∈D v(i) <
x
ℓ ·β , then Simultaneous
Greedy(D,v, c,B, x) outputs a set S such that
v(S) ≥ min
{
ℓx
(ℓ + 1)β
,
1
6
(
opt(D,B) −
2x
β
)}
.
Proof. Let t be the number of times line 3 was executed. At the end of the tth iteration, U is
the set of agents never examined. That is,U only contains agents that have non-positive marginal
utilities with respect to S (t+1)1 and S
(t+1)
2 . For the sake of readability, we henceforth use S1 and S2 to
denote S (t+1)1 and S
(t+1)
2 , respectively. Let R = D (U ∪S1∪S2) be the agents ik that were considered
at some point by the mechanism but were rejected, i.e., not added to either S (k)1 or S
(k)
2 . We first
partition R into two sets depending on why the corresponding agents were rejected. The set
Rc =
{
ik
 βB
x
v
(
ik
 S (k)jk ) < cıˆ
}
contains the agents rejected because the first inequality in line 4 was violated during the corre-
sponding iteration. Similarly, the set
RB =
{
ik
B(k)jk < βBx v
(
ik
 S (k)jk )
}
contains the agents rejected because the second inequality in line 4 was violated. Clearly, R =
Rc ∪ RB . We consider two cases, depending on whether RB is empty or not.
Case 1. Assume that RB , ∅ and let ik ∈ RB . That is, during the kth execution of line 3, (ıˆ, ˆ) =
(ik , jk ), but
βB
x
v
(
ik |S
(k)
jk
)
> B
(k)
jk
. Let S (k)jk = {ia1 , ia2 , . . . , ias }, where (ai )
s
i=1 is a subsequence of
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1, 2, . . . , t . Further, notice that, by its definition, B(k)jk = B −
∑s
τ=1
βB
x
v
(
iaτ |S
(aτ )
jk
)
. We have
v
(
S
(k)
jk
)
=
s∑
i=1
v
(
iai |S
(ai )
jk
)
=
x
βB
(
B − B
(k)
jk
)
>
x
βB
(
B − B
(k)
jk
)
+
x
βB
B
(k)
jk
−v
(
ik |S
(k)
jk
)
=
x
β
− v
(
ik |S
(k)
jk
)
. (1)
By submodularity and the way the agents in S (k)jk are chosen, we have
v(ia1) = v
(
ia1 |S
(a1)
jk
)
≥ v
(
ia2 |S
(a2)
jk
)
≥ . . . ≥ v
(
ias |S
(as )
jk
)
≥ v
(
ik |S
(k)
jk
)
.
Yet, each one of these values is at most maxi ∈D v(i) <
x
ℓ ·β
. Combining with (1), we have
ℓ ·max
i ∈D
v(i) <
x
β
≤ v
(
S
(k)
jk
)
+v
(
ik |S
(k)
jk
)
≤
s∑
τ=1
v
(
iaτ |S
(aτ )
jk
)
+v
(
ik |S
(k)
jk
)
≤ (s + 1) · v
(
ia1
)
,
and therefore, we conclude that
S (k)jk  = s ≥ ℓ. Now we repeat the same argument for the average
marginal value in the sum
∑s
τ=1v
(
iaτ |S
(aτ )
jk
)
. Using the simple observation that the smallest term
of a sum cannot exceed the average of the remaining terms, we get
x
β
≤ v
(
S
(k)
jk
)
+v
(
ik |S
(k)
jk
)
≤ v
(
S
(k)
jk
)
+
1
s
s∑
τ=1
v
(
iaτ |S
(aτ )
jk
)
≤
s + 1
s
v
(
S
(k)
jk
)
≤
ℓ + 1
ℓ
v
(
S
(k)
jk
)
, (2)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that f (z) = z+1
z
is decreasing.
Finally, to get the approximation guarantee for this case, we combine (2) with the fact that S is
at least as good as each greedy solution:
v(S) ≥ v(S jk ) ≥ v
(
S
(k)
jk
)
≥
ℓ
ℓ + 1
·
x
β
.
Case 2. Now assume that RB = ∅, i.e., R = Rc. LetC∗ be an optimal solution for the given instance
and define C1 = C∗ ∩ S1, C2 = C∗ ∩ S2 andC3 = C∗ (C1 ∪C2). By subadditivity, we have
opt(D,B) = v(C∗) ≤ v(C1) +v(C2) +v(C3) . (3)
Recall that Tj = alg2(S j ), j ∈ {1, 2}, is a 2-approximate solution with respect to opt(S j ,∞). Thus,
v(Cj ) ≤ opt(S j ,B) ≤ 2 · v(Tj ), for j ∈ {1, 2}, and inequality (3) gives
opt(D,B) ≤ 2v(T1) + 2v(T2) + v(C3) . (4)
Upper bounding v(C3) in terms of S1, S2,T1,T2 and r is somewhat more involved. We begin by
invoking the non-negativity of v , as well as its submodularity (as defined in of Definition 2.1(ii))
on S1 ∪C3 and S2 ∪C3. We have
v(C3) ≤ v(C3) +v(S1 ∪C3 ∪ S2) ≤ v(S1 ∪C3) +v(S2 ∪C3) . (5)
In order to upper bound v(S1 ∪ C3) we again use the submodularity of v , together with a couple
of facts about the marginal utilities of agents outside of S1. Since the mechanism stopped after t
iterations, maxi ∈D (S1∪S2∪R)v(i |S1) ≤ 0. Also, given that R = Rc, for all agents that got rejected at
some point, we know that they had very low marginal value per cost ratio with respect to both S1
and S2. In particular, if ik ∈ R, then cik >
βB
x v
(
ik |S
(k)
j
)
, for both j ∈ {1, 2}. We may now rely on
Definition 2.1(iii) to get
v(S1 ∪C3) ≤ v(S1) +
∑
ik ∈C3
v(ik |S1)
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≤ v(S1) +
∑
ik ∈C3∩R
v(ik |S1) ( v(ik |S1) ≤ 0 for ik ∈ C3 R )
≤ v(S1) +
∑
ik ∈C3∩R
v
(
ik |S
(k)
1
)
( by submodularity,v(ik |S1) ≤ v
(
ik |S
(k)
1
)
for ik ∈ D )
≤ v(S1) +
∑
ik ∈C3∩R
x
βB
cik (
βB
x v
(
ik |S
(k)
1
)
< cik for ik ∈ R )
Similarly, v(S2 ∪C3) ≤ v(S2) +
∑
ik ∈C3∩R
x
βB
cik . Also, recall that
∑
i ∈C ∗ ci ≤ B to get
v(S j ∪C3) ≤ v(S j) +
x
β
, for j ∈ {1, 2} . (6)
Finally, we may combine (4), (5) and (6) to get
opt(D,B) ≤ 2v(T1) + 2v(T2) +v(S1 ∪C3) +v(S2 ∪C3)
≤ 2v(T1) + 2v(T2) +v(S1) +v(S2) +
2x
β
≤ 6 ·v(S) +
2x
β
,
or, equivalently, v(S) ≥ 16
(
opt(D,B) − 2x
β
)
.
Combining Case 1 and Case 2, we obtain the claimed guarantee. 
So far, unless x = Θ(opt(D,B)), the approximation guarantee seems to be rather weak. In
fact, the way Simultaneous Greedy is used within Sample-then-Greedy requires that both
x = v(alg1(A1)) and opt(A2,B) are Θ(opt(A,B)). The next technical lemma guarantees that this
happens with high probability, unless there is an extremely valuable agent.
Lemma 3.7 (Follows from Bei et al. [10] and Leonardi et al. [34]). Consider any submodular func-
tion v(·). For any given subset T ⊆ A and a positive integer k assume that v(T ) ≥ k · maxi ∈T v(i).
Further, suppose that T is divided uniformly at random into two subsets T1 and T2. Then with proba-
bility at least 12 , we have that v(T1) ≥
k−1
4k v(T ) and v(T2) ≥
k−1
4k v(T ).
We are now ready to lower bound the approximation guarantee of Sample-then-Greedy.
Lemma 3.8. Assume that for some positive integer k , opt(A,B) > k · maxi ∈Av(i). Then with
probability at least 12 , Sample-then-Greedy(A,v, c,B) outputs a set S such that
v(S) ≥ min

⌊
k−1
4eβ
⌋
(k − 1)
e
(⌊
k−1
4eβ
⌋
+ 1
) , β(k − 1) − 8k
6
 ·
1
4βk
· opt(A,B) .
Proof. LetC∗ be an optimal solution for the given instance. By applying Lemma 3.7 withT = C∗
we have that with probability at least 12 it holds that v(Ai ∩C
∗) ≥ k−14k v(C
∗) for both i ∈ {1, 2}. In
what follows we assume that this is indeed the case. Thus,
opt(A,B) ≥ x = v(alg1(A1)) ≥
1
e
opt(A1,B) ≥
k − 1
4ek
opt(A,B)
and also opt(A2,B) ≥
k−1
4k opt(A,B).
3
The lower bound on x paired with the upper bound on maxi ∈Av(i), imply that
max
i ∈A
v(i) <
1
k
· opt(A,B) ≤
1
k
·
4ekβ
k − 1
·
x
β
≤
1⌊
k−1
4eβ
⌋ · x
β
.
3For the sake of presentation, here we write x = v(alg1(A1)) ≥
1
e opt(A1, B) rather than the technically correct E(x ) ≥
1
e opt(A1, B). However, as discussed in Remark 3.10, one can formally deal with this issue with a negligible effect on the
expected approximation guarantee while keeping the running time polynomial.
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Thus, we can use Lemma 3.6 with D = A2, x = v(alg1(A1)) and ℓ =
⌊
k−1
4eβ
⌋
. Therefore, Simulta-
neous Greedy(A2,v, cA2,B, x) outputs an S such that
v(S) ≥ min

⌊
k−1
4eβ
⌋
x(⌊
k−1
4eβ
⌋
+ 1
)
β
,
1
6
(
opt(A2,B) −
2x
β
)
≥ min

⌊
k−1
4eβ
⌋
(k − 1)
4ek
(⌊
k−1
4eβ
⌋
+ 1
)
β
opt(A,B) ,
1
6
(
k − 1
4k
opt(A,B) −
2
β
opt(A,B)
)
≥ min

⌊
k−1
4eβ
⌋
(k − 1)
e
(⌊
k−1
4eβ
⌋
+ 1
) , β(k − 1) − 8k
6
 ·
1
4βk
· opt(A,B) . 
Corollary 3.9. The set S returned by GenSm-Main(A,v, c,B) satisfies
505 · E(v(S)) ≥ opt(A,B) .
Proof. Suppose that maxi ∈Av(i) ≥
1
101 · opt(A,B). Then, with probability p at least 1/101 of
the optimal value is returned. Hence,
E(v(S)) ≥ p ·max
i ∈A
v(i) ≥
0.201
101
· opt(A,B) ≥
1
505
· opt(A,B) .
Next suppose that maxi ∈Av(i) <
1
101 · opt(A,B). We may apply Lemma 3.8 with k = 101. As
discussed before the description of mechanism Simultaneous Greedy, the parameter β is is equal
to 9.185. This implies that
⌊
k−1
4eβ
⌋
= 1. By substituting the values of k and β to the bound of Lemma
3.8, we get that with probability at least (1 − p)/2
v(S) ≥ min
{
50
e
,
110.5
6
}
·
1
3710.74
· opt(A,B) ≥
1
201.7367
· opt(A,B) ,
and thus,
E(v(S)) ≥
1 − 0.201
2
·
1
201.7367
· opt(A,B) ≥
1
505
· opt(A,B) . 
Remark 3.10. In our mechanisms we often use randomized approximation algorithms as sub-
routines. In particular, alg1 in Sample-then-Greedy and GenSm-Online, alg3 in MonSm-Con-
strained, and alg4 in GenSm-Constrained are all randomized. Yet, in the description of our
mechanisms—and more importantly in our analyses—we treat them as if there were deterministic,
e.g., we assume that x in line 2 of Sample-then-Greedy is at least 1e ·opt(A1,v, cA1,B). While this
is not technically accurate, we do so for the sake of presentation. However, we may instead use
the fact that for any constants δ ,η > 0, alg1 can be modified so that with probability at least 1− δ
it returns a solution of value at least
( 1
e − η
)
· opt(A1,v, cA1,B) in polynomial time, using standard
arguments.4 Thus, for any constant ε > 0 the analysis of GenSm-Main can be adjusted to hold
for an approximation factor 505 + ε instead. Similarly, the analyses of our other mechanisms can
be adjusted accordingly. Actually, since there is some slack in the approximation ratios derived in
this work, this extra ε due to the randomized subroutines can, in fact, be “hidden” in the current
ratios.
4For instance, even without going into the mechanics of alg1, running the algorithm
2 log2 (1−δ )
log2 (e−1)−log2 ((1+η)e−1)
times and
keeping the best solution suffices.
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4 ONLINE PROCUREMENT
Note that the mechanism presented in the last section already bares some resemblance to online
algorithms for the secretary model (although truthfulness is rarely a requirement there). Namely, a
part of the input is only used to estimate the quality of the optimal solution and then, based on that
estimation, some threshold is set for the remaining instance. On a high level, this is straightforward
to adjust for the secretary model; we use the first (roughly) half of the stream of agents to find
an estimate of opt(A,B) and then set a threshold similar to the one in Simultaneous Greedy.
However, there are a few issues one has to deal with.
First, Simultaneous Greedy goes through the agents in a specific order (in decreasing order of
the maximum marginal value with respect to either one of the two constructed sets). Even though
this fact is indeed used in the proof of Lemma 3.6, we show that even examining agents in arbitrary
order works well, albeit with a somewhat worse approximation factor. Note that this is not true
when there are other constraints on top of the budget-feasibility requirement, as in Section 5.
Second, towards the end, in line 9, Simultaneous Greedy runs an unconstrained submodular
maximization algorithm on S1 and S2 to possibly reveal a subset of them with much higher value.
While this is a critical step, we rely on a very elegant result of Feige et al. [21]: a uniformly random
set gives a 4-approximation for the unconstrained problem. Thus, every agent that passes the
threshold and is added to S j is only accepted to Tj with probability 1/2. The actual output of the
mechanism is a random choice S between S1, S2,T1 andT2 , made before the arrival of the first agent.
So, while the four sets are built obliviously with respect to the choice of S , the agents added to S
are irrevocably chosen while everyone else is irrevocably discarded.
One last issue is that we want the mechanism to occasionally return the single most valuable
agent. This, however, is easily resolved by running Dynkin’s algorithm [19] with constant prob-
ability instead. This mechanism samples the first n/e agents and then it picks the first agent
i ′, among the remaining agents, who is at least as good as the best agent in the sample, i.e.,
v(i ′) ≥ maxk≤n/e v(ik ). This guarantees that E(v(i
′)) ≥ 1e maxi ∈Av(i), where the expectation
is over the order of the agents.
The mechanism GenSm-Online below incorporates all these adjustments, yet maintains all the
good properties ofGenSm-Main. We assume a secretary setting, where the agents arrive uniformly
at random. In particular, agents have no control over their arrival time, so this is still a single-
parameter environment and truthfulness still means universal truthfulness, i.e., if we fix the random
bits of the mechanism, then for any arrival order no agent has an incentive to lie. Moreover, note
that GenSm-Online is order oblivious. That is, Theorem 4.1 holds even when the order of samples
and the order of values are (separately) chosen by an adversary.
Again, alg1 is the e-approximation algorithm of Kulik et al. [32]. The parameter β is set to 8.725
and, like the parameter in Simultaneous Greedy, is only relevant for the approximation factor.
Theorem 4.1. GenSm-Online is a universally truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible on-
line mechanism and achieves an O(1)-approximation in the secretary model.
Proof. Fix any particular arrival order i1, i2, . . . , in of the agents.
By fixing the sequence ρ of the random bits of the mechanism, we get a deterministic alloca-
tion rule GenSm-Online(ρ). In the case where this is Dynkin’s algorithm, it is straightforward
that—coupled with the threshold payment of B to the possible winner—it is truthful, individually
rational and budget-feasible. Otherwise, i.e., if lines 4-16 are executed, the proof of monotonicity,
and thus of truthfulness and individual rationality, ofGenSm-Online(ρ) is virtually identical to the
proof of Lemma 3.3. Similarly, the budget-feasibility is proved exactly like the budget-feasibility
of Simultaneous Greedy in Lemma 3.4.
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GenSm-Online(A,v, c,B)
1 With probability q = 0.4 :
2 Run Dynkin’s algorithm and return the winner
3 With probability 1 − q :
4 S1 = S2 = T1 = T2 = ∅; B1 = B2 = B
5 S =
{
S j , with probability 1/10, for each j ∈ {1, 2}
Tj , with probability 2/5, for each j ∈ {1, 2}
6 Draw ξ from the binomial distribution B(n, 0.5)
7 Let A1 be the set of the first ξ agents, and A2 = A A1
8 Reject all the agents in A1 and calculate x = v(alg1(A1))
9 for each i ∈ A2 as he arrives do
10 Let ˆ ∈ argmaxj∈{1,2} v(i |S j )
11 if ci ≤
βB
x v(i |S ˆ) ≤ B ˆ then
12 S ˆ = S ˆ ∪ {i}
13 B ˆ = B ˆ −
βB
x v(i |S ˆ)
14 With probability 1/2,T ˆ = T ˆ ∪ {i}; otherwise, T ˆ = T ˆ
15 Update S /* the update is consistent to the choice made in line 5 */
16 return S
Since GenSm-Online is a probability distribution over GenSm-Online(ρ) for all possible ρ, we
conclude that it is universally truthful, individually rational and budget-feasible. Also, given that
Dynkin’s algorithm and alg1 run in polynomial time and that the payments are easily determined,
GenSm-Online runs in polynomial time.
It remains to show that the solution returned by the mechanism is a constant approximation of
the offline optimum. It is not hard to see that when the most valuable agent is comparable to the
optimal solution, then Dynkin’s algorithm suffices to guarantee an overall good performance. In
particular, suppose that maxi ∈Av(i) ≥
1
250 · opt(A,B). Then, with probability q at least 1/e of the
1/250 of the optimal value is returned in expectation (with respect to the arrival order). Hence, if
X is the (possibly empty) set returned by GenSm-Online
E(X ) ≥
q
e
·max
i ∈A
v(i) ≥
q
e
·
1
250
· opt(A,B) ≥
1
1710
· opt(A,B) .
For the case where maxi ∈Av(i) <
1
250 ·opt(A,B), we are going to prove the analog of Lemma 3.8.
First, notice that randomly ordering the elements ofA and then picking the first ξ , where ξ follows
the binomial distribution B(n, 0.5), is equivalent to just picking each element ofAwith probability
1/2. This simple observation is crucial, because it allows to still use Lemma 3.7. So, assume it is
the case that opt(Ai ,B) ≥
k−1
4k opt(A,B) for i ∈ {1, 2}, where k = 250. Unless otherwise stated, all
expectations below are conditioned on this fact. Recall that this happens with probability at least
1/2 as discussed in the beginning of the proof of Lemma 3.8.
We will follow a similar case analysis as in the proof of Lemma 3.6, depending on whether the
set RB , defined below, is empty or not. Similarly to the notation used in Section 3, let i1, i2, . . . , in−ξ
be the agents of A2 ordered according to their arrival. Also, let S
(k)
1 , B
(k)
1 , S
(k)
2 , B
(k)
2 denote S1, B1,
S2, B2, respectively, at the time ik arrives. We will use S1 and S2 exclusively for their final versions.
Let R = A2 (S1 ∪ S2) be the agents ik that were rejected, i.e., not added to either S
(k)
1 or S
(k)
2 . We
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again partition R depending on why the agents where rejected, i.e., Rc (resp. RB ) contains everyone
rejected because the first (resp. the second) inequality in line 11 was violated.
Case 1. Assume that RB , ∅ and let ik ∈ RB . If jk is the value of ˆ chosen in line 10, then
βB
x
v
(
ik |S
(k)
jk
)
> B
(k)
jk
. Using the exact same argument leading to (1) (see proof of Lemma 3.6),
we get
v
(
S
(k)
jk
)
≥
x
β
− v
(
ik |S
(k)
jk
)
≥
x
β
−max
i ∈A
v(i) .
Given the known lower bound on x and upper bound on maxi ∈Av(i), this leads to
v(S jk ) ≥
(
k − 1
4ekβ
−
1
k
)
· opt(A,B) . (7)
Before we lower bound E(v(S)), it not hard to see that E(v(Tj )) ≥
1
2v(S j ), where the expectation is
over the random choices made in line 14. In fact, this is a direct corollary of the non-negativity of
v and the following well-known probabilistic property of submodular functions.
Lemma 4.2 (Feige et al. [21]). Let д : 2X → R be submodular. Denote by A[p] a random subset of
A where each element appears with probability p. Then E(д(A[p]))(1− p) · д(∅) + p · д(A).
By taking the expectation of v(S) over the random choices made in lines 14 and 5, we get
E(v(S)) =
1
10
·v(S1) +
1
10
· v(S2) +
2
5
· E(v(T1)) +
2
5
· E(v(T2))
≥
1
10
·v(S jk ) +
2
5
·
1
2
· v(S jk )
≥
3
10
·
(
k − 1
4ekβ
−
1
k
)
· opt(A,B)
≥
1
512
· opt(A,B) . (8)
Case 2. Assume that RB = ∅. Let C∗ be an optimal solution for the instance (A2,v, cA2,B) and
C1 = C
∗ ∩ S1, C2 = C∗ ∩ S2, C3 = C∗ (C1 ∪C2). Recall inequality (3) (see proof of Lemma 3.6):
opt(A2,B) = v(C
∗) ≤ v(C1) +v(C2) +v(C3) . (3)
To upper bound the value ofC1 and C2 we need the following result by Feige et al. [21].
Theorem 4.3 (Feige et al. [21]). Let v : 2A → R≥0 be a submodular function and let T de-
note a random subset of A, where each element is sampled independently with probability 1/2. Then
E(v(T )) ≥ 14 opt(A,v,∞).
By the definition of T1,T2 and Theorem 4.3, we get
v(Cj ) ≤ opt(S j ,B) = opt(S j ,∞) ≤ 4 · E(v(Tj )) , for j ∈ {1, 2} . (9)
For upper bounding v(C3) recall inequality (5) (see proof of Lemma 3.6):
v(C3) ≤ v(S1 ∪C3) +v(S2 ∪C3) . (5)
Using the same arguments leading to (6) (see proof of Lemma 3.6), we get
v(S j ∪C3) ≤ v(S j) +
x
β
, for j ∈ {1, 2} . (10)
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We may now combine (3), (9), (5) and (10). Note that E(v(Tj )), j ∈ {1, 2}, below is over the random
choices in line 14, while E(v(S j)), j ∈ {1, 2}, is over the random choices in both line 14 and line 5.
k − 1
4k
opt(A,B) ≤ opt(A2,B)
≤ 4 · E(v(T1)) + 4 · E(v(T2)) +v(S1) +v(S2) +
2x
β
= 10 · E(v(S)) +
2x
β
≤ 10 · E(v(S)) +
2
β
· opt(A,B) ,
or, equivalently,
E(v(S)) ≥
1
10
(
k − 1
4k
−
2
β
)
· opt(A,B)
≥
1
513
· opt(A,B) . (11)
Therefore, given that both A1 and A2 contain a good fraction of the optimal budget-feasible
solution, the expectation of v(S) is always at least 1513 · opt(A,B). Coupled with Lemma 3.7, this
means that the unconditional expectation of v(S) is at least 12 ·
1
513 · opt(A,B).
Hence, if X is the set returned by GenSm-Online, by the law of total expectation, we have
E(X ) ≥ (1 − p) ·
1
2
·
1
513
· opt(A,B) =
1
1710
· opt(A,B) .
We conclude that GenSm-Online achieves, in expectation, an 1710-approximation. 
One immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1 is the existence of an O(1)-approximation algo-
rithm for the non-monotone Submodular Knapsack Secretary Problem (SKS). To the best of our
knowledge GenSm-Online is the first such algorithm (see also Remark 4.5).
Formally, an instance of SKS consists of a ground set A = [n], a non-negative submodular objec-
tive v : A→ R+ and a given budget B. The elements of A arrive in a uniformly random order and
each element must be accepted or rejected immediately upon arrival. An algorithm for SKS has
access to n = |A|, to the costs of items that have arrived (i.e., each cost is revealed upon arrival)
and to a value oracle that, given a subset S ⊆ A of elements that have already arrived, returns v(S).
The objective is to accept a set of elements maximizing v without exceeding the budget.
It is straightforward to see that the only difference of SKS with the online procurement problem
studied in this section is the information about the costs. In SKS there is no notion of misreporting
a cost and thus it can be seen as a special case of our online problem where agents are guaranteed
to always reveal their true costs.
Corollary 4.4. There is an O(1)-approximation algorithm for the non-monotone SKS.
Remark 4.5. Bateni et al.[8] give an O(1)-approximation algorithm for the monotone SKS. They
claim, without a proof, that their result extends to the non-monotone SKS as well, using the same
ideas that work for the Submodular Secretary problem with a cardinality or a matroid constraint
(rather than a knapsack constraint). However, this does not seem to be the case. It is indeed true that
these ideas do pair well with cardinality and, more generally, (intersection of) matroid constraints
and they have been recently used to obtain fast randomized algorithms with good approximation
guarantees [14, 22]. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there are no examples in the liter-
ature where this random greedy approach does work for non-monotone submodular maximization
with knapsack constraints.
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5 ADDING COMBINATORIAL CONSTRAINTS
To illustrate the applicability of our approach, we turn to the case where the solution has to sat-
isfy some additional combinatorial constraint. With the exception of additive valuation functions
[1, 35], even for monotone submodular objectives no polynomial-time mechanisms using only
value queries are known. Here we show that the general approach of GenSm-Main can be uti-
lized to achieve an O(p)-approximation for p-systems, i.e., for independence systems with rank
quotient at most p. In particular, as stated in Corollary 5.4, this implies constant factor approxima-
tion for cardinality, matroid and matching constraints. As it is shown in Section 6, going beyond
independence systems (e.g., require that the solution forms a spanning tree) is hindered by strong
impossibility results.
Definition 5.1. An independence system is a pair (U ,I), where U is a finite set and I ⊆ 2U is a
family of subsets, whose members are called the independent sets ofU and satisfy:
(i) ∅ ∈ I, and
(ii) if B ∈ I and A ⊆ B, then A ∈ I.
Given a set S ⊆ U , a maximal independent set contained in S is called a basis of S . The upper rank
ur(S) (resp. the lower rank lr(S)) is defined as the cardinality of a largest (resp. smallest) basis of S .
A p-system (U ,I) is an independence system such that maxS⊆U
ur(S )
lr(S ) ≤ p.
For the sake of readability, we present the case of monotone submodular objectives here; the
non-monotone case is deferred to Appendix A. A technical highlight of our analysis, later used for
the non-monotone case as well, is Claim 5.3. The claim crucially depends on the order we consider
the agents, in order to bound the value lost because of the p-system constraint.
As usual, we assume the existence of an independence oracle. In particular, when we write that
I is part of the input of the mechanism, we mean that the mechanism has access to a membership
oracle for I. The parameter β is later set to 13/3. alg3 in line 5 can be any polynomial time
approximation algorithm for monotone submodular maximization subject to a knapsack and a
p-system constraint. Here we assume the (p + 3)-approximation algorithm of Badanidiyuru and
Vondrák [6].
MonSm-Constrained(A,I,v, c,B)
1 With probability q = 0.2 :
2 return i∗ ∈ argmaxi ∈Av(i)
3 With probability 1 − q :
4 Put each agent of A in either A1 or A2 independently at random with probability
1
2
5 x = v(alg3(A1)) /* a (p + 3)-approximation of opt(A1, v, cA1, B) */
6 S = ∅; BR = B;U = A2
7 whileU , ∅ do
8 Let ıˆ ∈ argmaxi ∈U v(i |S)
9 if cıˆ ≤
βB
x
v(ıˆ |S) ≤ BR and S ∪ {ıˆ} ∈ I then
10 S = S ∪ {ıˆ}
11 BR = BR −
βB
x
v(ıˆ |S)
12 U = U {ıˆ}
13 return S
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Theorem 5.2. Assuming that the solution has to be an independent set of a p-system, there is a
universally truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible,O(p)-approximation mechanism that runs
in polynomial time for (non-monotone) submodular objectives.
Proof. The proof of the theorem for the non-monotone case is deferred to Appendix A. Here
we prove thatMonSm-Constrained above has all the stated properties for monotone submodular
objectives. First, we observe that S starts as an independent set, namely the empty set, and it is
expanded only if it remains an independent set. Hence, at the end MonSm-Constrained does
return a feasible solution, i.e., S is in I.
At this point, following the same reasoning used forGenSm-Main andGenSm-Online, it should
be easy to see that MonSm-Constrained is universally truthful, individually rational, budget-
feasible, and runs in polynomial time.
Next we show that the solution returned by the mechanism is an O(p)-approximation of the
optimum. First, suppose that maxi ∈Av(i) ≥ opt(A,B)/(26(p + 10)). Then, for the set S returned
by MonSm-Constrained, we have E(v(S)) ≥ q · maxi ∈Av(i) ≥
1
5 · opt(A,B)/(26(p + 10)) ≥
opt(A,B)/(138(p + 10)).
For the case where maxi ∈Av(i) < opt(A,B)/(26(p + 10)), we follow the same notation and the
same high level approach as with the approximation guarantees of GenSm-Main and GenSm-On-
line. So, i1, i2, . . . , i |A2 | are the agents ofA2 in the order considered by the mechanism. By S
(k) and
B
(k)
R
we denote S and BR , respectively, at the time ik arrives, and we only use S for the final set
returned. The set R = A2 S contains the agents ik that were not added to S (k) and it is further
partitioned to
Rc =
{
ik
 βB
x
v
(
ik | S
(k)
)
< cıˆ
}
, RB =
{
ik
B(k)R < βBx v
(
ik | S
(k)
)}
and RI = R (Rc ∪ RB ) .
Assume that opt(Ai ,B) ≥
k−1
4k opt(A,B) for i ∈ {1, 2}, where k = 26(p + 10). Thus, x =
v(alg1(A1)) ≥
k−1
4(p+3)k opt(A,B). Recall that this does happen with probability at least
1
2 , as dis-
cussed in the beginning of the proof of Lemma 3.8.
Case 1. Assume that RB , ∅. Let ik ∈ RB , i.e.,
βB
x v
(
ik |S
(k)
)
> B
(k)
R
. Using the same argument as
in the proof of Lemma 3.6, we get v
(
S (k)
)
≥ x
β
− maxi ∈Av(i) and, given the known bounds on x
and maxi ∈Av(i), this leads to v(S) ≥
(
k−1
4(p+3)kβ −
1
k
)
· opt(A,B).
By substituting k = 26(p + 10) and β = 133 , it is a matter of simple calculations to get
v(S) ≥
5
276(p + 10)
· opt(A,B) . (12)
Case 2. Assume that RB = ∅ and let C∗ be an optimal solution for the instance (A2,v, cA2,B). By
monotonicity, we have
opt(A2,B) = v(C
∗) ≤ v(S ∪C∗) . (13)
Because of the p-system constraint, however, deriving the analog of inequality (6) needs some
extra work. By Definition 2.1(iii), we have
v(S ∪C∗) ≤ v(S) +
∑
ik ∈C
∗ S
v(ik |S) ≤ v(S) +
∑
ik ∈C
∗∩Rc
v(ik |S) +
∑
ik ∈C
∗∩RI
v(ik |S) . (14)
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Wemay upper bound the first sum using the fact that all agents involved got rejected because they
had very low marginal value per cost ratio. That is,∑
ik ∈C ∗∩Rc
v(ik |S) ≤
∑
ik ∈C ∗∩Rc
v
(
ik |S
(k)
)
<
x
βB
∑
ik ∈C ∗∩Rc
cik ≤
x
β
≤
opt(A,B)
β
. (15)
For the second sum we prove the following result that crucially relies on the fact that agents are
examined in decreasing marginal value.
Claim 5.3.
∑
ik ∈C
∗∩RI
v(ik |S) ≤ p · v(S) .
Proof of Claim 5.3. Recall that when we index agents we follow the ordering imposed by the
mechanism, i.e., ik is always the agent picked at the kth execution of line 8 of MonSm-Con-
strained.
Suppose that there is a mapping f : C∗ ∩ RI → S such that
(i) if f (ik ) = iℓ , then v
(
ik |S
(k)
)
≤ v
(
iℓ |S
(ℓ)
)
for all ik ∈ C∗ ∩ RI , and
(ii)
f −1(iℓ) ≤ p for all iℓ ∈ S .
We slightly abuse the notation and write S f (ik ) instead of S (ℓ) when f (ik ) = iℓ . The existence of f
implies that∑
ik ∈C
∗∩RI
v(ik |S) ≤
∑
ik ∈C
∗∩RI
v
(
ik |S
(k)
)
≤
∑
ik ∈C
∗∩RI
v
(
f (ik ) | S
f (ik )
)
≤ p ·
∑
iℓ ∈S
v
(
iℓ |S
(ℓ)
)
= p · v(S) .
The first inequality follows from the submodularity of v , while the second and third inequalities
follow from (i) and (ii), respectively.
Next, we are going to construct such an f . Let S = {ia1 , ia2, . . . , ias } andC
∗ ∩RI = {ib1, ib2 , . . . ,
ibt }, where both (ai )
s
i=1 and (bi )
t
i=1 are subsequences of 1, 2, . . . , |A2 |. We are going to map the first
p elements ofC∗ ∩ RI , ib1 , . . . , ibp , to ia1 , the next p elements ibp+1 , . . . , ib2p , to ia2 , and so on. That
is, f (ibj ) = ia⌈j/p⌉ .
It is straightforward that f satisfies property (ii). In order to prove property (i), it suffices to
show that for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}, agent ibj is considered by MonSm-Constrained after agent
f (ibj ). Indeed, if that was the case, by the definition of ıˆ in line 8 and submodularity, we would get
v
(
ia⌈j/p⌉ | S
(a⌈j/p⌉ )
)
≥ v
(
ibj | S
(a⌈j/p⌉ )
)
≥ v
(
ibj | S
(bj )
)
,
for all ibj ∈ C
∗∩RI , as desired. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is somek ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t},
such that bk < a ⌈k/p ⌉ ; in fact, suppose k is the smallest such index. Consider the sets T =
{ia1 , ia2 , . . . , ia⌈k/p⌉−1} ⊆ S and Q = {ib1 , ib2, . . . , ibk } ⊆ C
∗ ∩ RI . By construction,T ∈ I. Moreover,
we claim that T is maximally independent in T ∪ Q . Indeed, each ibτ ∈ Q was rejected because
S (bτ ) ∪ {ibτ } < I, and since S
(bτ ) ⊆ T we get T ∪ {ibτ } < I. This implies that lr(T ∪ Q) ≤ |T |. On
the other hand, Q ∈ I because Q ⊆ C∗ ∈ I. As a result ur(T ∪Q) ≥ |Q |. However, notice that
p · |T | = p (⌈k/p⌉ − 1) < p (k/p + 1 − 1) = k = |Q | .
Thus, ur(T∪Q )lr(T∪Q ) ≥
|Q |
|T |
> p, contradicting the fact that (A,I) is a p-system. We conclude that f
satisfies both (i) and (ii), and therefore,
∑
ik ∈C
∗∩RI
v(ik |S) ≤ p ·v(S). ⊳
Now, combining (13), (14), (15), and Claim 5.3, we have opt(A2,B) ≤ (p + 1) ·v(S)+
opt(A,B)
β , and
using the lower bound on opt(A2,B), v(S) ≥
1
p+1 ·
(
k−1
4k −
1
β
)
opt(A,B). Again, by substituting k
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and β , it is a matter of calculations to get
v(S) ≥
5
276(p + 10)
· opt(A,B) . (16)
By Lemma 3.7, both (12) and (16) hold with probability at least 1/2. Hence,
E(v(S)) ≥ (1 − q) ·
1
2
·
5
276(p + 10)
· opt(A,B) =
1
138(p + 10)
· opt(A,B) . 
For matroid constraints we have p = 1 and for matching constraints p = 2. Since cardinality
constraints are a special case of matroid constraint, we directly get the following.
Corollary 5.4. For cardinality, matroid and matching constraints, there is a universally truthful,
budget-feasible O(1)-approximation mechanism for (non-monotone) submodular objectives.
6 LOWER BOUNDS
In the value query model there is a strong lower bound on the number of queries for deterministic
algorithms for monotone XOS objectives due to Singer [40]. This result is based on a lower bound
of Mirrokni et al. [36] on welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions. As the latter also holds
for randomized algorithms, so does Singer’s result as well, essentially with the same proof. We
restate it here for completeness. Note that it holds even when the costs are public knowledge.
Theorem 6.1 (Singer [40]). For any fixed ε > 0, any (randomized) n
1
2−ε -approximation algorithm
for monotone XOS function maximization subject to a budget constraint requires exponentially many
value queries (in expectation).
When onemoves to non-monotone objectives, as it is the case in this work, it is possible to prove
even stronger lower bounds. Below we show that for general XOS objectives, exponentially many
value queries are needed for any non-trivial approximation even without the budget constraint.
As this result applies to the purely algorithmic setting, it is of independent interest.
It is known that in many settings there is a separation between the power of value and demand
queries of polynomial size, see, e.g., [11]. To stress this difference in our setting, recall that in the
demand querymodel, the class of XOS objectives admits a truthfulO(1)-approximationmechanism
with a polynomial number of queries.
Theorem 6.2. For any fixed ε > 0, any (randomized) n1−ε -approximation algorithm for XOS func-
tion maximization requires exponentially many value queries (in expectation).
Proof. We follow, on a high level, the approach in [36]. Recall that A = [n] and choose a set R
of size |R | = ρ = n/4 uniformly at random amongst all the subsets of A of size ρ. We are going
to construct two XOS functions, v1 and v2, that are hard to tell apart, i.e., to distinguish between
them with constant probability, an exponential number of value queries will be required.
For any T ⊆ A, let αT be the additive function that assigns the value 1 to each i ∈ T and the
value 0 to each i < T . For τ = nε/2/4, we define v1 as the maximum over all such additive functions
on sets of size τ :
v1(S) = max
T ⊆A: |T |=τ
αT (S), for all S ⊆ A .
Further, let β be the additive function that assigns the value 1 to each i ∈ R and the value −ρ to
each i < R. We define v2 as the maximum between v1 and β :
v2(S) = max {v1(S), β(S)} , for all S ⊆ A .
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Clearly, bothv1 andv2 are XOS functions since each of them is defined as the maximum of a finite
number of additive functions. Also notice that for any S * R we have v2(S) = v1(S). However,
opt(A,v1,∞) = τ and opt(A,v2,∞) = ρ = n1−ε/2 · τ > n1−ε · τ . Hence, any (possibly randomized)
algorithm that achieves an approximation ratio smaller or equal to n1−ε can distinguish between
the two functions.
Consider a value query for some set S . This query can distinguish betweenv1 andv2 if and only
if S ⊆ R and |S | > τ , and otherwise it will reveal no information about R. We will call such an S a
distinguishing set. For a given S with |S | > τ , the probability that S ⊆ R, over the random choice
of R, is ( ρ
|S |
)( n
|S |
) ≤
(
eρ
|S |
) |S |
(
n
|S |
) |S | = (e4
) |S |
<
(e
4
) nε/2
4
, (17)
using the well-known fact that for 1 ≤ k ≤ m we have
(
m
k
)k
≤
(m
k
)
≤
(
em
k
)k
.
Now, let q(·) be a polynomial and p ∈ (0, 1] be a constant. Suppose first that there is a deter-
ministic algorithm that asks queries S1, S2, . . . , Sq(n) and distinguishes between v1 and v2 with
probability at least p. Note that the choice for S j can depend on all previous queries S1, . . . , S j−1 as
well as the answers of the value query oracle obtained for those sets. Also, the choices made by the
algorithm are the same for all non-distinguishing queries regardless of whether we present v1 or
v2 to the algorithm. Using a union bound, it then follows that the probability that we distinguish
between v1 and v2 is at most
q(n)∑
i=1
( ρ
|Si |
)( n
|Si |
) < q(n) (e
4
) nε/2
4
= o(1).
which contradicts p being constant. In case of a randomized algorithm, we can condition on the
random bits of the algorithm. Averaging over the choices of the random bits, we are still only able
to distinguish between v1 and v2 with exponentially small probability. 
One immediate consequence of Theorem 6.2 is that when we care for constant approximation
ratios, the result of Theorem 3.1 is (asymptotically) the best possible for budget-feasible mecha-
nism design. General submodular objectives is the broadest class of well studied non-monotone
functions one could hope for, even for randomized mechanisms.
Combinatorial Constraints. We now turn to the problem of maximizing subject to additional
constraints on top of the budget constraint. To further motivate our restriction to p-system con-
straints, we restate here a lower bound of Badanidiyuru and Vondrák [6]: for independence system
constraints one cannot achieve an approximation factor better than maxS⊆U
ur(S )
lr(S ) with a polyno-
mial number of queries. Thus, the result of Theorem 5.2 is asymptotically optimal.
Theorem 6.3 (Badanidiyuru and Vondrák [6]). For any fixed ε > 0, any (randomized) (p + ε)-
approximation algorithm for additive function maximization subject to p-system constraints requires
exponentially many independence oracle queries (in expectation).
As we mentioned in the beginning of Section 5, we cannot really go beyond independence sys-
tems and have any non-trivial approximation guarantee in polynomial time. This is illustrated in
Theorem 6.4 and Corollary 6.5 below. Theorem 6.4 generalizes Singer’s [40] strong impossibility
result for deterministically “hiring a team of agents” to any constraint that is not downward closed
below. Note that it holds even for super-constant approximation ratios, even for the special case
of additive objectives, irrespectively of any complexity assumptions.
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Theorem 6.4. Let F ⊆ 2A be any collection of feasible sets that is not downward closed. Then there
is no deterministic, truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible mechanism achieving a bounded
approximation when restricted on F , even for additive objectives.
Proof. Since F is not downward closed, there is some F ∈ F with |F | ≥ 2 which is minimally
feasible, i.e., if S ⊆ F and S ∈ F , then S = F .
Towards a contradiction, suppose that there is a deterministic, truthful, budget-feasible, α-appro-
ximation mechanism alg for additive objectives, where α = α(n) > 1. Consider the following
instance on A where v is additive: for each agent i ∈ F , v(i) = 1/|F |, ci = ε ≪ B/|F |, while for
each agent i ∈ A F , v(i) = δ < 1/α , ci = B. All the F -feasible and budget-feasible solutions are F
and, possibly, some of the singletons outside of F . If alg returns any solution other than F , then
v(alg(A,v, c,B)) ≤ δ < 1
α
=
1
α
· opt(A,B), which contradicts the approximation guarantee of alg.
So, alg should return F .
However, the latter is true even if we slightly modify the instance, so that for a specific j ∈ F ,
c j = B − (|F | − 1) · ε . Therefore, in the original instance, the threshold payment for j is at least
B−(|F | −1) · ε . In fact, due to symmetry, all the threshold payments in the original instance should
be at least B−(|F |−1) ·ε . Since |F | ≥ 2 and B−(|F |−1) ·ε ≈ B, this contradicts the budget-feasibility
of alg. 
The next corollary of Theorem 6.3 states that under general combinatorial constraints it is not
possible to achieve any non-trivial approximation with polynomially many queries. While it is
not hard to prove it directly, given Theorem 6.3 it suffices to notice that such a lower bound holds
even for general independence systems. Indeed, there are cases where ur(U )lr(U ) is Θ(n) like the (n− 1)-
systems of independent sets of star graphs.
Corollary 6.5. For any fixed ε > 0, any (randomized) n1−ε -approximation algorithm for additive
function maximization subject to general feasibility constraints requires exponentially many queries
(in expectation).
7 DISCUSSION
We already discussed in the Introduction that designing deterministic budget-feasible mechanisms
has been elusive. Positive results are only known for specific well-behaved objectives [1, 2, 17, 18,
29, 40, 41] and, even worse, beyond monotone submodular valuation functions no deterministic
O(1)-approximation mechanism is known, irrespectively of time or query complexity.We consider
obtaining deterministic, budget-feasible, O(1)-approximation mechanisms—or showing that they
do not exist—the most intriguing related open problem.
While our results provide a proof of conceptwith respect to what is asymptotically possible with
polynomial-time, truthful mechanisms, the constants involved are very far from being practical.
Although we do not claim that the different parameters appearing in the description and the anal-
ysis of our mechanisms are optimized, they had to be carefully chosen and we suspect there is not
much room for improvement. Bringing down these approximation factors is another interesting
direction.
Finally, it is mentioned in Remark 3.2 that the high level approach of Simultaneous Greedy can
be turned into a deterministic 7-approximation algorithm. We believe that it is worth exploring
other possible applications of the high level approach of Simultaneous Greedy, both in mecha-
nism design and in constrained non-monotone submodular maximization.
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A PROOF OF THEOREM 5.2 FOR THE NON-MONOTONE CASE
Theorem 5.2. Assuming that the solution has to be an independent set of a p-system, there is a uni-
versally truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible,O(p)-approximation mechanism that runs in
polynomial time for non-monotone submodular objectives.
Proof. Here we move on to the case of non-monotone submodular objectives. GenSm-Con-
strained is a modification of GenSm-Main that maintains a set F of “feasible” pairs, i.e., of pairs
(i, j) such that S j ∪ {i} is an independent set. In each step, the best such pair (ıˆ, ˆ) is chosen and,
given that v(ıˆ |S ˆ ) is neither too high nor too low, ıˆ is added to S ˆ . The parameter β is 8.5 and alg4
in line 5 can be any polynomial time approximation algorithm for non-monotone submodular
maximization subject to a knapsack and a p-system constraint. Here we assume the (1+ε )(p+1)(2p+3)p -
approximation algorithm of Mirzasoleiman et al. [37] for ε = 10−3.
GenSm-Constrained(A,I,v, c,B)
1 With probability q = 1/3 :
2 return i∗ ∈ argmaxi ∈Av(i)
3 With probability 1 − q :
4 Put each agent of A in either A1 or A2 independently at random with probability
1
2
5 x = v(alg4(A1)) /* a (1 + ε)(p + 1)(2p + 3)/p-approximation of opt(A1, v, cA1, B) */
6 S1 = S2 = ∅; B1 = B2 = B; U = A2
7 F = {(i, j) | i ∈ U , j ∈ {1, 2} and S j ∪ {i} ∈ I} /* all ‘‘feasible’’ pairs */
8 while F , ∅ do
9 Let (ıˆ, ˆ) ∈ argmax(i, j)∈F v(i |S j)
10 if cıˆ ≤
βB
x v(ıˆ |S ˆ ) ≤ B ˆ then
11 S ˆ = S ˆ ∪ {ıˆ}
12 B ˆ = B ˆ −
βB
x
v(ıˆ |S ˆ )
13 U = U {ıˆ}
14 Update F
15 for j ∈ {1, 2} do
16 Tj = alg2(S j ) /* a 2-approximate solution with respect to opt(S j, v, cSj , ∞) */
17 Let S be the best solution among S1, S2,T1,T2
18 return S
Clearly, S1, S2 start as independent sets and they are expanded only if they remain indepen-
dent sets. As subsets of independent sets, T1,T2 are independent sets as well. Hence, GenSm-Con-
strained does return a solution S ∈ I.
Like in the monotone case, following the reasoning used for GenSm-Main and GenSm-On-
line, it is easy to prove universal truthfulness, individual rationality, budget-feasibility, and—given
polynomial-time oracles—polynomial running time. What is left to show is that E(v(S)) is anO(p)-
approximation of opt(A,B).
First, suppose that maxi ∈Av(i) ≥
1
136(p+6) ·opt(A,B). Then, for the set S returned byGenSm-Con-
strained,
E(v(S)) ≥ q ·max
i ∈A
v(i) ≥
1
3
·
1
136(p + 6)
· opt(A,B) >
1
410(p + 6)
· opt(A,B) .
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Whenmaxi ∈Av(i) <
1
136(p+6) ·opt(A,B), we may follow the same approach as with the our other
proofs. Recall the notation. That is, i1, i2, . . . , i |A2 | are the agents of A2 in the order considered by
the mechanism and j1, . . . , j |A2 | are the corresponding ˆ selected in the kth execution of line 9.
5 By
S
(k)
j and B
(k)
j we denote S j and Bj , respectively, at the time ik is selected. We only use S1, S2,B1,B2
for the final version of the corresponding set or quantity. The set R = A2 (S1 ∪ S2) contains the
agents ik that were not added to S
(k)
jk
and it is further partitioned to Rc =
{
ik |
βB
x v
(
ik |S
(k)
ik
)
< cıˆ
}
,
RB =
{
ik | B
(k)
ik
<
βB
x v
(
ik |S
(k)
ik
)}
, and RI = R (Rc ∪ RB ).
Recall that Lemma 3.7 guarantees that opt(Ai ,B) ≥
k−1
4k opt(A,B) for i ∈ {1, 2}, where k =
136(p + 6), happens with probability at least 1/2. Assume this is indeed the case. Therefore, x =
v(alg1(A1)) ≥
(k−1)p
4k(1+ε )(p+1)(2p+3) opt(A,B).
Case 1. Assume that RB , ∅. By repeating the analysis of Case 1 in the proof of Lemma 3.6, we
get
v(S) ≥
(
(k − 1)p
4k(1 + ε)(p + 1)(2p + 3)β
−
1
k
)
· opt(A,B) .
By substituting k = 136(p + 6), β = 8.5 and ε = 10−3, it is a matter of simple calculations to get
v(S) ≥
1
136(p + 6)
· opt(A,B) . (18)
Case 2. Next, assume that RB = ∅. Let C∗ be an optimal solution for the instance (A2,v, cA2,B)
andC1 = C∗ ∩ S1,C2 = C∗ ∩ S2,C3 = C∗ (C1 ∪C2). By subadditivity (recall inequality (3)) and the
fact that Tj = alg2(S j ), j ∈ {1, 2}, is a 2-approximate solution with respect to opt(S j ,∞) we get
opt(A2,B) = v(C
∗) ≤ v(C1) +v(C2) + v(C3) ≤ 2v(T1) + 2v(T2) +v(C3) . (19)
For v(C3) recall inequality (5) (see proof of Lemma 3.6):
v(C3) ≤ v(S1 ∪C3) +v(S2 ∪C3) . (5)
To upper bound v(S j ∪C3) we work like in the proof of 5.2 because of the p-system constraint. By
Definition 2.1(iii), we have
v(S j ∪C3) ≤ v(S j) +
∑
ik ∈C3
v(ik |S j )
≤ v(S j) +
∑
ik ∈C3∩Rc
v(ik |S j ) +
∑
ik ∈C3∩RI
v(ik |S j ) . (20)
We upper bound the first sum exactly as in (15):∑
ik ∈C3∩Rc
v(ik |S j ) ≤
∑
ik ∈C3∩Rc
v
(
ik |S
(k)
j
)
<
x
βB
∑
ik ∈C3∩Rc
cik ≤
x
β
≤
opt(A,B)
β
. (21)
For the second sum we have the analog of Claim 5.3. Recall that we never used the monotonicity
of v in the proof of Claim 5.3. With just minor changes in notation, we can prove the following.
Claim A.1. For both j ∈ {1, 2},
∑
ik ∈C3∩RI
v(ik |S j ) ≤ p ·v(S j ) .
5In case not all agents are considered, what remains in F is arbitrarily indexed and paired with some ˆ . This is as if we had
a few dummy iterations at the end of the while loop in order to exhaust all agents by rejecting them one by one.
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Now, combining (19), (5), (20), (21), and Claim A.1, we have
opt(A2,B) ≤ 2v(T1) + 2v(T2) + (p + 1)v(S1) + (p + 1)v(S2) + 2
opt(A,B)
β
,
and, using the definition of S and the lower bound on opt(A2,B),
v(S) ≥
1
2p + 6
·
(
k − 1
4k
−
2
β
)
opt(A,B) .
By substituting k and β , it is a matter of calculations to get
v(S) ≥
1
136(p + 6)
· opt(A,B) . (22)
Since, due to Lemma 3.7, both (18) and (22) hold with probability at least 1/2, we have
E(v(S)) ≥ (1 − q) ·
1
2
·
1
136(p + 6)
· opt(A,B) >
1
410(p + 10)
· opt(A,B) ,
thus concluding the proof. 
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